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Abstract: After decades under a Stalinist regime, the latecomer transition in Albania began 
thanks  to  the  large-scale  exodus  of  hundreds  of  young  people  which  stimulated  the 
mobilization of university students. In turn, the student movement became the catalyst of a 
wider social mobilization once fear faded away from December 1990 onwards. 
These  experiences  were  nevertheless  short-lived  as  they  ended  up  absorbed  and 
marginalized by the new political elites that had emerged from the intellectual milieus once 
'organic'  to  the  system.  Furthermore,  such  late-in-coming  protest  waves  occurred  in  a 
situation  of  economic  and  institutional  breakdown  that  constituted  a  considerable 
encumbrance for the re-organization of Albanian civil society. 
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Albania  was the latecomer  in  the 1989 wave of  democratization  in  Europe. 
Predictably, it was not easy for the country’s civil society to re-emerge after 
decades of a Stalinist regime that had successfully eliminated every alternative 
source of social power through the considerable use of coercion and achieved 
total control of the population through the party-state organization. 
The  unexpected  outcome  of  the  Albanian  regime’s  collapse  was  the 
state’s  collapse,  an  unlikely  context  for  the  flourishing  of  civil  society.  In 
addition, the Albanian case is one of a transition driven by the transnational 
context, that is by ‘democratic contagion’ from the other 1989 revolutions, and 
where social contention exploded but social forces found it hard to reorganise. 
Even though protests played a role in regime change in Albania, fundamental 
factors explaining the Albanian transition and its characteristics were: repeated 
episodes of the mass emigration and the diffusion of anarchy, looting and other 
forms of violence on state property connected with the economic breakdown.
The scholarly literature available on the Albanian transition is still scarce 
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and focuses mostly on political events. The country's main cultural institutions 
have not yet overcome the deep crisis of transformation that started 20 years 
ago. In addition, the post-communist context has been dominated by the same 
actors that were the protagonists of the regime’s collapse and therefore every 
account available is affected by the political affiliation of the analyst (Qesari 
2011).  Added  to  this  is  the  limited  interest  of  international  scholars  in  the 
country,  unless  in  connection  to  major  political  crises  or  issues  such  as 
migration  and  transnational  crime.  The  parallel  disintegration  of  the  former 
Yugoslavia  overshadowed  events  in  the  peripheral  Balkan  country  (Vickers 
1997:76).  
Transition: periodization
The periodization commonly used to describe the democratic transition divides 
it into: 
•a first period when the regime still had a strong hold on the country and 
attempted to initiate limited reforms to remain in control of the 
liberalization process (December 1989 – November 1990);      
•a second phase when two short waves of street protests dominated the political 
arena, leading to the formation of the first non-communist political parties 
and the organization of the first pluralist elections (December 1990- March 
1991); 
•the period of instability, widespread protests and state disintegration (April  
1991 – February 1992); 
•the last phase when the first non communist government was elected, 
democratization and economic liberalization started and a degree of political 
stabilization was achieved after the turbulence of the regime change 
(March 1992-1994).
The  country  had  been  under  the  iron  fist  of  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
Albanian Party of Labour (PLA), Enver Hoxha, from 1945 until his death in 
1985. When his successor, Ramiz Alia, was elected, changes were extremely 
gradual.  At  the  9th Communist  party  Plenum on 22nd-23rd  January  1990,  the 
dramatic  economic conditions of the country were publicly admitted but  the 
measures  announced  to  face  the  situation  were  very  limited.  The  country’s 
economy remained  thoroughly  collectivized  and the  ruling  party  showed no 
intention of introducing political pluralism. Information about the 1989 Velvet 
revolutions  and  the  collapse  of  the  Berlin  wall  had  reached  the  country. 
Regardless of tight censorship, the population was informed of the changes in 
the communist bloc thanks to Italian, Greek and Yugoslav television. However, 
after  more  than  four  decades  of  a  totalitarian  regime,  fear  continued  to 
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dominate. 
The  first  half  of  1990  was  characterized  by  attempts  at  organizing 
protests, but the regime was still capable of strict control and responded with 
hundreds  of  arrests  in  Shkodër,  Kavaje  and the capital  Tirana.  Alia  showed 
some timid signs of opening with a few basic liberalizing measures such as the 
reopening of the Ministry of Justice and the reintroduction of legal practice. By 
late spring telephone lines to the West, closed since World War II, were opened 
and the issuing of passports was allowed. A modest liberalization of the press 
took place: many taboo topics could now be discussed,  and works by a few 
authors, previously forbidden, were allowed to circulate. However, these late 
and limited reforms taken to address the situation by controlling change from 
above instead encouraged anti-government feeling to come to surface. 
In an ever tenser  political  atmosphere,  about 400 people -  growing to 
5,000 - sought refuge in foreign embassies in the first mass attempt to flee the 
country  on  July  2nd 1990.  Police  fired  on  them  only  occasionally,  but  the 
government  declared  a  partial  state  of  emergency.  Although  the  regime 
explained the episode as the work of thugs, this first massive flight marked the 
beginning of transition as it was the first consistent outbreak of discontent that 
encouraged later popular revolts. Indeed the episode was a sign not of political 
organization but of long standing and deeply hidden discontent. Indeed, it had a 
tremendous impact on a population that had not been allowed to exit the country 
for  decades  as  it  showed  that  the  state  security  apparatus  was  no  longer 
invincible. 
Ramiz Alia reacted to the crisis by forcing a few hard liners in the Party 
to  resign,  by  increasing  state  salaries  and  by  arranging  demonstrations  in 
support of the regime against ‘vagabonds and traitors’.  He did not accept to 
introduce political pluralism until the end of 1990, introducing only what was 
then defined a “pluralism of ideas”. Since the summer, disorder had spread in 
the country, becoming endemic in many provincial towns. Material conditions 
were harsh and, as the winter began, food and power shortages became the rule. 
Troops  were  moved  to  the  cities  to  guard  public  buildings  and  frequently 
engaged in small clashes with isolated protesters. Their intimidating power was 
still considerable and the secret police was greatly feared. 
In November 1990 the Central Committee made its last attempt to define 
a  political  strategy  for  the  country.  Albania  was  now  the  only  remaining 
communist state in Europe and university students had rising expectations as to 
the democratization of the country and were growing impatient with worsening 
living conditions (Vickers 1997:33). Up to December, the regime had managed 
to  avoid  significant  street  protests.  Decades  of  repression  and  the  political 
control of all institutions had reduced the population to silence and boycott was 
the only way to express profound and widespread discontent. Finally, spaces for 
an  opposition  movement  grew  with  the  weakening  of  the  state  apparatus, 
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worsening economic conditions and rising expectations. 
The  stage  was  taken  first  by  the  university  student  community  on 
December 6th  (Vickers 1997). The first protests focused on living standards in 
student  houses,  but  quickly  moved  to  the  political  sphere  to  include  the 
introduction of political pluralism. Ramiz Alia repeatedly met with the students 
and on 10th December he convened the Central Committee to make it declare 
the introduction of political pluralism (Abrahams forthcoming).  The students 
had brought up the issue but Alia wanted to take credit for it. During his last 
meeting with the students, Alia informed them of the introduction of political 
pluralism rather  than  accept  the  request  coming  from the  streets.  With  this 
strategy of gradual concession Alia hoped to remain in control of the political 
process. 
The day after, the first non-communist political party was established: the 
Partia  Demokratike e  Shqipërisë (PDsh)  or  Democratic  Party  of  Albania, 
formed by a few members of the student movement and the emissaries sent by 
Alia to mediate with them, in particular the cardiologist Sali Berisha, a trusted 
member of the Communist party. The first free elections were announced for 
the following February, then postponed to March 31st as a new wave of protest 
exploded.  Liberalization  from  above  had  introduced  political  pluralism  but 
Albania  was  still  defined  as  a  “Socialist  Republic”.  Major  protests  started 
around a student huger-strike with thousands of workers and citizens pulling 
down the statue  of  Enver  Hoxha that  stood in the  capital’s  main  square  on 
February 20th. The government resigned and an 8 member Presidential Council 
was formed. 
On February 22nd the Army was the protagonist in a bloody episode of 
repression against citizens demonstrating in front of its headquarters in Tirana 
(see below). Party hard-liners were stirring up fears of a coup and rumours that 
Nexhmije Hoxha, the widow of the dictator, was behind the conspiracy enraged 
the crowds that had mobilized. However, according to Abrahams (forthcoming) 
Alia was in a position to avoid a  coup d'etat from the Army and conservative 
elements  in  the  Party  of  Labour.  The  latter,  particularly  deep-rooted  in  the 
provinces, did not have sufficient strength to organize a reactionary response.
Rather, the state appeared weaker and weaker as a result of the deepening 
economic crisis. In March rumours spread that it was possible to flee to Italy as 
visas would be issued. People jumped onto buses, trains, trucks, and horses or 
walked to the coastal town of Durres. Overall about 25,000 Albanians left for 
Italy in those weeks.  Similarly, a wave of illegal crossings of the Albanian-
Greek  mountain  borders  began.  The  communist  party  lost  its  monopoly  on 
power on 31st March 1991 when the first pluralist elections were held. However, 
the Party  of  Labour  of  Albania  (PLA) won the consultations.  The literature 
debates whether these should be considered the first free elections however. The 
period of time was indeed too short for the opposition to prepare after decades 
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under the Stalinist  regime. They had neither the experience nor the funds to 
organize an adequate campaign, in particular to reach the countryside where the 
majority of the population resided as result of the regime’s policy of limiting 
internal migration. Rural areas were dominated by fear of the security apparatus 
but also of losing what little they had with the radical reforms announced by the 
Democratic Party (DP). Wide urban support had led the DP to underestimate the 
situation in the countryside. As the opposition leader Berisha commented: “it 
was  the  village  troika  that  defeated  us:  the  major,  the  president  of  the 
cooperative,  the  party  secretary  kept  a  terrorized  population  under  control” 
(Champseix 1992:184). 
In the days following the elections the main urban centres were hit by a 
number of violent demonstrations. In protest against the killing of four people 
on April 2nd, the DP boycotted the first meeting of the parliament, but in the 
following weeks, despite being the official opposition, the new party politically 
led the battle in the country and the parliament (Abrahms forthcoming). As the 
economic  situation  deteriorated  to  reach,  in  May 1991 a  general  strike  was 
called  by  the  new  independent  trade  unions,  asking  for  salary  raises  and 
investigations into police violence in Shkodër during the April protests. 
After  weeks  of  the  strike  the  government  resigned  and  a  Stability 
Government was formed on June 4th. Still led by the Party of Labour, it included 
opposition members and was formed to guide the country to new elections in 
March 1992. Alia would remain president until fresh elections three years ahead 
of schedule. On June 12th the PLA changed its name and symbols and became a 
Socialist  Party;  the  young Fatos Nano was nominated  its  new leader.  Some 
foreign  aid  now  began  to  arrive  but  the  country's  economic  situation  was 
dramatic and in August a new wave of refugees reached Italy. Thousands of 
people arrived at the ports of Bari, Brindisi and Otranto on board the tugboat 
Vlora and other fishing boats, floating craft and barges (Abrahams forthcoming) 
while violent clashes took place around the port of Durres when the police tried 
to prevent the seizing of ships (Vickers 1997:70). 
The  Autumn  was  characterized  by  a  new  wave  of  strikes  and  by 
November  29th 1991  the  DP  withdrew  from  the  stability  government.  The 
country collapsed into a spiral of lawlessness and dozens of people died during 
street riots in the following months as private violence also spread.  During the 
dramatic  winter  of  1991-92,  the first  foreign military intervention to  placate 
food  riots  and  lawlessness  took  place.  This  was  Operazione  Pellicano 
consisting of  1,000 unarmed Italian soldiers  distributing humanitarian  aid in 
various parts  of  the country,  especially  in  the remote  mountain  areas where 
people risked starvation.  
The regime change could be considered achieved when a non-communist 
political party won the elections for the first time on March 22nd 1992. This was 
the second time that multi-party elections had taken place, but the first time a 
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change in power occurred with the Albanian Democratic Party (DP) winning 
the consultation and the leader of the opposition, Sali Berisha, becoming the 
Albanian president. This time the West,  and the USA in particular, provided 
wide support to the DP campaign. Voter turnout was very high at around 80%. 
The  DP  won  with  62%  of  the  votes  and  gained  92  of  the  140  seats  in 
parliament. Together with the Republican party and the Social Democrats, the 
anti-communists held 100 seats. The Socialist Party won 25.7%, 38 seats.  
Whether these were the first free elections or not, they were indeed the 
first  whose  results  were  not  contested  in  Albania’s  post-communist  history. 
Since  that  point  Albania  has  performed  poorly  in  terms  of  the  quality  of 
democracy. As observed by Elbasani (2008:5) the new democratic institutions 
“failed to achieve either a degree of stability or a sufficient level of legitimacy” 
in the years to come. The former president Ramiz Alia was first placed under 
house arrest charged with the   misappropriation of state funds, and later he was 
imprisoned for two and a half years. The paradox for a country where political 
repression had been so harsh was that those high-ranking officials prosecuted 
were not charged for human rights abuses but for economic crimes such as the 
misuse of funds, and no investigations into the secret police that terrorized the 
population for decades, the Sigurimi, were carried out (HRW 1992).  
The  new  post-communist  leadership  absorbed  the  short-lived  social 
movements that emerged in the struggle against the regime, in particular the 
student movement, and marginalized its members. Grown within the communist 
party  apparatus  and  not  within  a  dissident  movement,  it  soon  showed 
authoritarian inclinations. It used the old party-state tools to repress discontent 
and  in  1992  even  used  secret  police  and  paramilitary  forces  to  demobilize 
workers  and  crack  down  on  union  independence.  Finally,  due  to  the  harsh 
economic situation at home, the great majority of people simply demobilized or 
sought new opportunities abroad. 
Protests
The first signs of a small student protest took place in a student house in the 
northern town of Shkodër only at the beginning of December 1989 (Champseix, 
1990: 310). The first timid attempts at organizing a public protest against food 
shortages and in favour of democratic reforms on the streets of Shkodër started 
on January 11th 1990. In this traditionally anti-communist centre, troops were 
brought from Tirana to immediately silence discontent (Vikers 1997:20).  
Abrahams  (forthcoming)  highlights  the  difficulties  for  widespread 
discontent to emerge in public, to build a movement, overcome the prevailing 
fear and face police control and power in repressing the first signs of protests. In 
Tirana  the  information  about  arrests  in  the  northern  city  arrived  but  fear 
continued to hamper the capacity to organize and protest publicly for months. 
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Similarly, in spring 1990 the town of Kavaje saw episodes of symbolic protests 
by individuals that remained isolated due to widespread fear. A turning point 
was July 1990, when the mass  emigration of  thousands of  people described 
below took the shape of a contingent opportunity rather than a protest,  even 
though  the  nature  of  the  situation  could  be  considered  to  bridge  the  two 
categories. The embassy crisis showed breaches in the repressive power of the 
state apparatus and opened up the way for months of growing instability. 
The first significant political protests occurred in December 1990. They 
started  as  student  protests  but  achieved  wider  support;  what  is  more,  they 
managed  to  obtain  the  concession  of  political  pluralism.  The  first  non-
communist  party originated here. The mass protests quickly spread from the 
capital to the main cities, including the Shkodër in the north, the port of Durrës 
and the industrial centre of Elbasan. Everywhere the demonstrators demanded 
an  end  to  one-party  rule,  multiparty  elections,  and  major  changes  in  the 
country's economic structure (Keesing 1990). The days following the student 
protests were characterized by riots in cities like Shkodër, Kavaja, Durres and 
Elbasan. Young men expressed their rage by destroying signs, busts, and books 
by Hoxha, looting shops and clashing with police (Abrahams forthcoming). As 
stressed  by  Vickers  (1997:34)  the  opposition  had  “a  random  and  anarchic 
character (...) attacks on a public building at night by a few people who would 
then rapidly disappear into the darkness was a much more typical expression of 
the  public  mood  than  the  kind  of  large-scale  organized  meeting  and  street 
demonstration that had developed elsewhere in Eastern Europe”. 
Later on February 5th a new wave of protest started among students at the 
Institute of Agriculture on the outskirts of Tirana. They were soon joined by 
their colleagues from the Student City in the city centre. Their request was for 
the resignation of the dean and improvements in living standards. In two days 
the Student City mobilized not only around economic issues but also political 
issues such as the compulsory study of Marxist-Leninist theory and the ruling 
Party history, and the name of the Enver Hoxha university. Alia predictably 
rejected these requests, suggesting the issues would be solved after the political 
election by the new parliament or with a national referendum. It should be noted 
that  the  Democratic  Party  leaders  proved  very  cautious  to  the  students’ 
demands, as they were focused on organizing the first free elections to be held 
later  that  month.  However,  it  was  thanks  to  the  students’  uncompromising 
approach that  things  started  to  move  faster.  As their  protests  continued and 
grew,  a referendum was held among students  and professors  concerning the 
university name change. In just a few hours around 8.000 signatures from a total 
of 11.000 students and professors at the university were collected to support the 
request.  The  consultation  was  held  under  the  supervision  of  the  official 
commission of students, but was considered illegal (Mustafaj 1993:124). As a 
consequence,  on  February  18th  the  students  announced  the  beginning  of  a 
hunger-strike and seven hundred and twenty-three people placed their names on 
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the strikers' list, including a handful of professors (Abrahams forthcoming). The 
hunger-strike continued for the next three days. New people joined and held 
speeches:  ordinary  citizens  from all  over  the  capital  and  workers  from the 
Kombinat Enver Hoxha factory in Tirana and the mines in the mountains near 
the capital city. 
By February 20th thousands of people had rallied at the university campus 
to support the students. To disperse the demonstrators, the police fired warning 
shots - further angering the protesters who started to march towards the city’s 
main Skanderbeg Square. Hardly able to contain the people the police could not 
prevent Hoxha's statue being pulled down amid chants of “Enver-Hitler”. 20 
people  were  injured  in  the  clashes  but  eyewitness  accounts  stressed  that 
members  of  the  security  forces  sympathized  with  the  protesters  (Abrahams 
forthcoming).  Once  again  hoping  to  keep  the  control  of  the  reforms,  Alia 
announced  that  the  university’s  name  would  be  changed  in  line  with  its 
reorganization  into  4  parts  a  few  hours  later.  That  night  the  government 
resigned and an 8 member Presidential Council was formed. The next day, more 
monuments  were  toppled  in  various  towns  including  Girokaster,  Hoxha's 
birthplace. 
On February 22nd rumours spread that the Army was conspiring to restore 
Hoxha's monument in Tirana. Barricades were built and flying bullets shot in 
the air around the Military Academy. During the confrontation with the special 
police forces sent to disperse the protest four people were killed, including one 
member of the police (Abrahams forthcoming, see below). The regime’s idea of 
controlling the liberalization process from above worked in controlling the two 
protest waves, but it was illusory and the communist electoral victory at the first 
pluralist elections in March 1991 turned out to be a pyrrhic one. In the weeks 
following the elections, workers and students participated in a series of scattered 
protests  asking for  badly  needed  economic  reforms.  On April  1st the  police 
killed a fourteen-year-old boy in Tirana.  The same day Shkodër became the 
epicentre of the protests. High school students organized a sit-in in front of the 
PLA headquarters (Champseix 1992:184), and on April 2nd four more people 
were  killed  by  unidentified  shots  and  60  people  injured  during  a  protest 
denouncing electoral fraud. The crowd then stormed the Labour party premises 
and set them on fire (Lawrence 2011). 
On May 16th a general strike called by the recently legalized Union of 
Independent  Trade  Unions  (BSPSH) involved 250.000 workers  in  particular 
from the industry and transportation sectors, paralysing a country where almost 
no private cars circulated as ownership had been prohibited until very recently 
(Champseix  1992:186).  The  BSPSH presented  a  list  of  seventeen  economic 
demands,  calling  for  a  50%  wage  increase  for  all  workers,  better  working 
conditions,  and police  prosecutions  for  the  April  2nd killings.  In  Lawrence's 
account: “The BSPSH’s strike committee instructed essential service workers in 
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the water, electrical, medical and food production industries to keep working 
while  expressing  solidarity  with  their  fellow  workers.  This  accommodation 
allowed  an  ample  supply  of  bread  to  be  available  throughout  the  strike” 
(Lawrence 2011). A further step was taken on May 25th 1991 when two hundred 
miners from the coal mines in Valias began a hunger strike deep in the pit. In 
solidarity with the Valias miners,  hundreds more workers across the country 
begun their own hunger strikes and protests in cities including Durres, Shkodër, 
Vlora, Korcë and Tirana (Mustafaj 1993:109). The protest movement paralyzed 
the country and led to the resignation of the communist-led government. 
During the summer there were new mass attempts to leave the country. 
By October a series of protest rallies took place in Tirana together with country-
wide  strikes.  Strikes  protesting  about  living  conditions  included  those  by 
teachers, miners and Tirana's transport workers, as well as a general strike in the 
copper  mining  district  of  Puke  in  support  of  its  demand  to  become  a  free 
economic zone (Keesing 1991). In November 1991 the government expressed 
concern over the breakdown in public order in the Tropojë and Shkodër districts 
due to shortages of food and energy (Keesing 1991b). In December 1991 20.000 
people gathered in Tirana to celebrate the first anniversary  of the democratic 
movement and protest against food and fuel shortages. In the town of Lac two 
people were killed in food riots, but many other parts of the country were also 
affected  by disturbances  before the elections in  March 1992,  and dozens  of 
people were killed during the winter (Vickers 1997:72). Another major strike 
was organized in Tirana in January 1992 by the Union of Independent Trade 
Unions and garnered 20,000 supporters (Keesing 1992).  
The first  non-communist  government  inherited the problems of  public 
order and for a while had to confront the new independent trade unions. On 26 th 
August 1992 the workers at the Polican munitions complex surrounded the town 
of Berat, took two public officers hostage, and set fire to the factory’s office 
building.  Violence  spread  in  the  streets  and  six  people  were  injured.  The 
government was forced to accept economic concessions to calm the situation. 
As stressed by Vickers (1997:86), the conflict showed “the unpredictability of 
outbreaks of violence in urban centres, and the fact that trade unions were still 
an independent force”. The reaction of the new government was to crack down 
on trade union independence shortly after. In December, the government reacted 
to a prolonged hunger strike and occupation at the Bulquize chromite mine by 
sending  in  paramilitary  units  that  intimidated  workers  by  placing  dynamite 
around the top of the mine shaft. Similarly, a few weeks later, paramilitary units 
were sent to Kukes to face workers asking for the land compensation they had 
been promised (Vickers 1997:86). 
Problems with public order were not only due to violent strikes, looting 
and food riots connected with the economic collapse: the breakdown in state 
authority also resulted in a crime wave between 1991 and 1992. A few protests 
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were organized to denounce the mounting violence. The government reacted by 
channelling  resources  to  improve  policing and by frequently  applying death 
penalty. In 1993 there were 15 executions in Tirana alone (Vickers 1997:132). 
Structural conditions 
The type of regime and its development
Albania  remained  a  Stalinist  regime  until  its  end.  While  other  communist 
regimes de-stalinized their systems after 1956, Albania preferred to break its 
relationship with the Soviet Union and establish a new alliance with China until 
1978.  In  order  to  avoid  any  liberalizing  influences  after  the  rapprochement 
between Beijing and Washington, the Albanian communist regime completely 
isolated  itself  from  the  external  world,  choosing  economic  and  political 
autarchy  or  self-reliance  and  thus  keeping  total  control  over  its  small 
population. Occasionally, Albania is described as belonging to the category of 
sultanistic  regimes,  introduced  by  Linz  &  Stepan  to  discuss  cases  such  as 
Ceaucescu's  Romania.  The  unpredictable  and  despotic  intervention  of  the 
communist leader Enver Hoxha did indeed form a permanent threat against all 
individuals, groups and institutions in Albania. In addition, the Albanian regime 
used  the  local  traditional  clan  culture  and  customary  repertoires,  generally 
known as Kanun, in order to impose its control. For instance, it was common to 
punish an entire family for anti-socialist crimes attributed to one member, thus 
hitting strong family allegiances. However, it is fundamental to underline that 
total power was organized around the communist model of the party-state in its 
totalitarian  Stalinist  version.  The  country  was  fundamentally  modernizing 
during  the  45  years  of  authoritarian  rule  through  the  extraordinary  use  of 
coercion and repression. Quoting the data of the Association of Former Political 
Prisoners, Abrahams stresses that “34,135 people were imprisoned for political 
reasons during the four decades of communist rule, and 59,009 internally exiled. 
5,487 people were executed after bogus courts” (Abrahams, forthcoming).1 
The late reforms introduced by Ramiz Alia were far too limited to bring 
significant results in terms of liberalization. What was announced in the spring 
of 1990 was the release of political prisoners who had spent more than twenty-
five years in prison. In April six Albanian citizens, members of the Popaj family 
that had been political  refugees at the Italian embassy in Tirana since 1985, 
were finally allowed to leave the country. In May imprisonment and the death 
penalty  for  anti-socialist  propaganda were abolished.  The illegal  crossing of 
state  borders  was  reduced to  a criminal  offence  and no longer  considered a 
1Vickers (1997: 255) quotes instead the Helsinki Committee with 4.800 executions of political prisoners 
between 1945-91 but stresses that these figures are conservative estimates. As a reference point in terms of pop-
ulation, Albania had 1.1 million inhabitants in 1945 and according to the last census, the population in 2011 was 
2.8 million.     
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counter-revolutionary  act.  The  Ministry  of  Justice,  closed  since  1968,  was 
reopened and private legal practice was reintroduced. As recalled by Elbasani 
(2008:5) “for the viability of the democratisation agency, the communist total 
hold  of  power  until  the  very  end  of  the  regime”  had  heavy  long  term 
implications.  Not  only  had  the  party-state  hampered  the  formation  of  any 
independent civil society organization, but also, given the total control exercised 
by the communist party until the very end, the birth of the first opposition party, 
the Democratic Party, should be attributed to the manoeuvres of the communist  
apparatus  in  power.  Indeed,  all  relevant  public  figures  that  emerged  in  the 
opposition, with the exception of students, had previously been members of the 
communist party and were sent by Alia as mediators during the student protests. 
In  addition,  the  student  component  was  soon  marginalised  in  the  newly 
established  Democratic  Party.  After  the  collapse  of  the  regime,  the  DP 
leadership continued the communist  practice of the political appropriation of 
state  institutions  and  established  a  new  one-man  rule,  limiting  democratic 
participation and mismanaging the economic transition (Elbasani 2008).  
Internally,  very  few  voices  were  able  to  speak  out  against  the 
authoritarian  practices  of  the  new  democratically  elected  government.  The 
socialist party was heavily hit by various measures, from the incarceration of its 
leaders to the firing of thousands of public employees that refused to change 
their  political  affiliation  (Abrahams  forthcoming).  These  practices  were  not 
used in a context of totalitarian control and therefore the formation of public 
opinion did gradually occur,  despite  the poor quality  of  democracy.  Foreign 
accounts of the first half of the 1990s were filled with enthusiastic praise for the 
country's democratization until a new state-society collapse in 1997 confronted 
western donors with a new emergency (ICG 1999). 
Economic conditions
The Albanian communist regime had thoroughly collectivized the economy and 
individuals could not privately own even an animal or a car. Ramiz Alia was as 
prudent  in  reforming  the  economy  as  he  was  in  the  political  realm.  The 
catastrophic economic crisis was certainly a fundamental  structural condition 
enabling regime change in Albania, as it helps explain the profound disaffection 
with the regime in the country, the mass emigration that contributed to its fall, 
and the months of anarchy that accompanied the transition. Indeed, the risk of 
famine during the winter of 1991-1992 in the mountainous areas in the north of 
the country distinguished the Albanian transition from any other regime change 
in the region. In the last few yeas of communist rule, the shortage of spare parts 
and fuel,  as well  as  absenteeism at  work had reduced production to half  its 
capacity,  and  once  factories  and  mines  were  abandoned,  the  economy  was 
barely functioning. While the regime procrastinated over the need for economic 
reforms,  by  late  1990  the  people  started  to  de-collectivize  the  land 
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spontaneously, abandon factories and destroy state properties. 
When  the  anti-communist  mobilization  increased  from  early  1991 
onwards, the economy was basically paralysed. On the one hand the economic 
crisis during the transition was so severe that almost everything came to be seen 
as a possible source of income, pieces of public buildings included. Literately 
anything was seized for this purpose: windows, chairs, tables, manhole covers 
from the streets.  Everything that  could be taken from public  properties  was 
dismantled and taken home. On the other hand, the political meaning of such 
acts should not be underestimated: the looting and the attacks on state properties 
also expressed rage against the regime. Some interpretations suggest that the 
mass departures of people in 1991 were a tool used by the communist elite to 
put pressure on foreign donors whilst attempting to avoid conflict at home by 
finally allowing some people to escape from the country. In this line, the regime 
hoped to use the first migration flows to obtain aid from western countries, but 
the situation was impossible to control due to the extreme economic crisis and 
the related legitimacy crisis of the system. 
Economic liberalization consistently took off only with the elections of 
March 1992 and the first Democratic Party-led government. Up to that point, 
and  for  the  long  and  economically  desperate  months  of  the  transition,  the 
communists  had  dragged  their  feet  over  the  reform  process,  making  the 
transition even more  painful.  The deep transformations which occurred after 
with so-called shock therapy were highly traumatic but, considering the tragic 
condition of the economy, did at least stimulate some kind of growth. Indeed, in 
the first few years after the transition, Albania appeared and was described by 
all  international  reports as  an economic tiger  for  its  consistent  growth rates. 
However,  the  economy's  new  start  was  based  on  foreign  aid,  migrant 
remittances and illegal trafficking favoured by the country’s proximity with the 
former Yugoslavia, hit by international sanctions during civil wars.
Social conditions
The Albanian communist regime was particularly harsh in the field of social 
control:  all  mass organizations set  up by the communist  party-state,  such as 
trade unions, youth organizations, women's unions, artists' associations and the 
like constituted instruments for mass mobilization, control and the preservation 
of  power  (Biberaj  1998).  As underlined by Baruti,  the  Albanian  communist 
regime imposed a ban on all  independent organizations from 1956 onwards, 
when a law restricted the activities of all  associations created in the country 
since the beginning of the century, effectively closing them down: “the only 
organisation that survived was the Red Cross that existed until 1964. From 1964 
to 1990 the only non-governmental organisation working in Albania was the 
association of Hunters” (Baruti 1996).
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Many intellectuals later observed that in the 1990s citizens could speak 
only of the construction of civil society, not of reconstruction since the Party 
and society were indistinguishable under the old regime. Not only that: the very 
concept  of  civil  society  was  unknown  until  that  point:   in  the  Albanian 
dictionary published in 1980 the term “civil society” does not appear (Krasniqi 
2004:19).  45 years  of  totalitarian rule  had profoundly  transformed Albanian 
society  through  industrialization,  collectivization,  mass  literacy,  and  the 
struggle  against  religious  institutions  and  faiths  as  well  as  deeply  rooted 
customs. The Albanian communist regime, just like any other, was based on a 
modernizing ideology that aimed at profound changes in a very short period of 
time in an attempt to challenge western capitalist modernization by imposing a 
radically new project of economy and society.
Among the products of such changes was a young population, as high 
birth rates had almost tripled the population since 1945. One of the PLA's main 
concerns in the late 1980s was how to deal with a youth that, as stressed by 
Vickers  (1997:120),  was  seen  as  “apathetic,  unruly  and  undisciplined  (...) 
increasingly exposed to foreign influences” due to widespread access to foreign 
TV programmes. Retrospectively, the only predictable drive for political change 
lay with the young Albanians, that is with the student movements as well as 
with massive exit from the isolated country. 
International relations
Albania had been a totally isolated country, choosing autarchy as its political 
and economic model at the end of the 1970s. In the first decades of communist 
rule, international relations were oriented eastward and shaped by three main 
alliances with other regimes in Yugoslavia, Russia, and China.2 These alliances 
shaped the different  periods of the regime until  the last  phase,  when Hoxha 
imposed complete isolation in a bid to maintain power.  The country suffered 
considerable  consequences  from  this  isolation,  not  only  in  relation  to  its 
population - whose freedom of movement even within the boundaries of the 
state was strictly limited well before complete autarchy – but also due to the 
economic  consequences  of  this  choice.  De  facto  the  industrial  base  of  the 
country  started  to  break down well  before  the  collapse  of  the regime when 
foreign support and technology was withdrawn (Lohmel 1996).
The first  sign of the regime’s intentions to abandon autarchy came in 
1987 (Vickers 1997), but the effective return to the international political arena 
2 The Albanian communist party received Yugoslav support during the Second World War to organize the  
resistance and in the early post-war years; with the break between Tito and Stalin in 1948 Tirana sided with Mo-
scow and relied considerably on Soviet financial aid until 1961. As Ever Hoxha did not accept the idea of the  
de-stalinization Albania broke the relationship with the Soviet Union and from half 60s it established a new alli-
ance with China. The latter as well was central in term of financial and technical support. However, the rap-
prochement between Beijing and Washington could not be tolerated by Hoxha who imposed the autarchic turn 
to the country from 1978 onwards. 
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took  place  in  February  1988  with  the  country’s  participation  in  a  Balkan 
conference  in  Belgrade.  The  political  and  cultural  proximity  to  the  1989 
revolution could not be ignored as change swept through the Eastern Bloc to 
which Albania had first belonged and later isolated itself from. Geographical 
proximity  allowed  information  and  influence  to  reach  Albania  via  ordinary 
radio and TV programmes with no need for neighbouring countries to invest in 
anti-communist  propaganda  as  the  USA  did.  More  than  direct  foreign 
interference, what mattered for Albania was its European belonging. 
For more than a decade from the turn of the 1980s, the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia  had  emerged  as  a  problematic  aspect  of  Albanian  politics.  The 
Kosovo  issue  in  particular  became  a  quasi-structural  element  in  Albanian 
political development. Western powers pushed local elites to keep a low profile 
and  abandon  any  revisionist  rhetoric  around  the  idea  of  a  Greater  Albania 
incorporating  Kosovo.  US-Albanian  relations  were  resumed  just  two  weeks 
before  the  first  multiparty  elections  in  1991.  As  Abraham  (forthcoming) 
stresses,  the  first  DP  statements  in  1991  about  Albania-Kosovo  national 
reunification in the Balkans alarmed Washington, and caused the Americans to 
postpone political support for the opposition party until after the 1991 elections. 
During the spring of 1991 the US government chose a more proactive role in the 
country, supporting Berisha's leadership, limiting his extremism, and using him 
to persuade the Kosovans  to  maintain  a  non violent  stance  in  the  Yugoslav 
conflict.     
In addition, the consequences of the war were particularly visible in terms 
of the impact of international sanctions against the former Yugoslav countries 
and the flourishing illegal market, particularly in fuel and arms, until the Dayton 
agreements  of  1995.  As  for  Europe,  Albania  was  soon  considered  a 
predominantly  Italian  and  Greek  affair,  with  migration  flows  becoming  the 
main  element  shaping  Tirana's  foreign  relations.  However,  the  two 
neighbouring  EU countries  were  not  prepared  for  the  transition  in  Albania. 
Fearing more waves of refugee,  Italy organized foreign military intervention 
during the winter of 1991-92 as food riots and lawlessness spread throughout 
the country. Operazione Pellicano involved 1,000 unarmed Italian soldiers who 
distributed  humanitarian  aid  to  various  parts  of  the  country.  As  it  was  not 
involved  in  the  historical  conflicts  over  nation-state  borders  that  haunt  the 
region,  Italy's  interposition in  Albanian affairs  was  better  accepted than any 
Greek effort would have been. In following years a few conflicts over minority 
issues emerged in Albanian-Greek relations. 
Paradoxically for a country that defended its sovereignty to the point of 
autarchy,  the  most  extreme  form of  protectionism,  after  the  collapse  of  the 
communist regime Albania ended up extremely dependent on foreign aid and 
repeatedly avoided falling apart only thanks to foreign military interventions: 
the first occasion was during the winter of 1991-92; the second in 1997 due to 
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internal political and civil strife;  and finally in 1999 during the Nato war in 
Kosovo as a result of the massive refugee flows from the neighbouring country. 
Contingent  political opportunities
The third wave of democratization should be considered as the most important 
contingent political opportunity to stimulate the first timid protests in 1990, the 
massive emigration wave in summer 1990, and later the regime change. 
In 1988 a series of articles attacking Perestroika and Gorbachev appeared 
in  the  Albanian  press,  highlighting  a  growing  awareness  of  the  changing 
international context. Yet until the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 
1989,  changes  in  the  Albanian  system  had  been  very  marginal  (Vickers 
1997:14-17).  The  1989  “contagion”  had  a  fundamental  role  to  play  in 
generating  the  regime’s  collapse,  and  in  many  respects  regime  change  was 
similar to other countries in the bloc. In particular, the death of Ceaucescu on 
25th  December 1989 was relevant for the Albanian nomenclature and for the 
social movements fighting against the regime in December 1990. According to 
many accounts, the Romanian example frightened the Party leaders and, at the 
beginning of 1990, they consequently initiated a series of concessions with the 
idea  of  controlling  the  inevitable  liberalization  from  above  (see  Langer 
1996:231; Kola 2003:1994; Mustafaj 1993:27-30). The embassy crisis in July 
1990, when thousands requested asylum at western embassies, marked another 
turning point in the transition to democracy as the people proved stronger than 
the security  forces  for  the  first  time.  By  July  1990 about  5.000 people had 
besieged western embassies: the first case was submitted on June 20th and the 
crisis peaked on July 2nd. 
Echoing the regime’s view of these events, many accounts describe the 
protagonists  of  these  mass  exoduses  as  emerging  from  semi-criminal  and 
alienated sub-cultures (Vickers 1997:34). Among others, the future DP member 
Mustafaj (1993:31) stresses that only a few dozen of the 5 thousand people who 
succeeded  in  entering  the  western  embassies  had  a  school  diploma,  and  no 
political slogan was heard at the time. As described by the most important and 
recent work available on the transition (Abrahams forthcoming), just as in the 
failed  protests  and  riots  in  early  1990  in  Shkodër,  Kavaje  and  Tirana,  the 
protagonists of the embassy crisis were deeply dissatisfied, often unemployed 
young men that saw no future in Albania and were drawn by strong myths of 
the  West.  They  did  not  have  a  clear  political  orientation  apart  from  their 
dissatisfaction with the regime.  Yet their mass migration was a fundamental 
chapter of the struggle against the regime. Their actions reproduced the German 
example  of  the  previous  year  when  thousands  of  citizens  showed  their 
opposition to the regime by “voting with their  feet”  (Hirschman 1993).  The 
collapse  of  the  Albanian  regime  was  the  product  of  a  similar  positive 
relationship between exit and voice as identified by Hirschman in the case of 
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the DDR: as in Honecker’s East Germany in 1989, the “exit” of thousands of 
people encouraged others to “voice” their protest and bring down the regime. 
With a few exceptions, there was limited response from the regime to the 
mass emigration, probably indicative of low morale among soldiers and police. 
Even though the Albanian authorities denied requests for food and tents and cut 
off the embassies’ water, in the end they broke the deadlock by allowing the 
first group to leave the country on July 10th. Two days later all the people had 
gone (Abrahams forthcoming). 
There were a few other important similar episodes during the transition, 
leading up to July 1992 when a new wave of 6000 people reached Italy (Vickers 
1997:84). All were relevant in the internal political struggle in various ways, 
including the fact that, when Italian and Greek authorities deported people back 
to Albania and put pressure on the authorities to police their border posts and 
harbours, they contributed to the escalation of disorder and chaos in the country 
(Elbasani 2008). One event considered important in the Albanian transition that 
gives a sense of the central role that intellectuals used to occupy in the country 
is the flight to France of the renowned writer Ismail Kadare in October 1990. 
His decision to ask for political asylum was traumatic for the nascent public 
opinion, which interpreted it as a sign that the reform process had reached a 
dead end (Champseix 1992:215).  Kadare’s  words could not  be found in the 
Albanian press but they reached the population through the Voice of America 
radio programme. The literature on transition considers this episode central to 
the further stirring up of the situation, and to pushing thousands of university 
students onto the streets of Tirana to ask for the dictatorship to end. Finally, 
another turning point is generally considered to be the visit of the US Secretary 
of State James Baker on June 22nd. In Tirana a mass of 300,000 people had 
gathered  waving  small  American  and  Democratic  Party  flags.  The 
unprecedented public support that welcomed the American officials prepared 
the ground for the strong support Washington provided to the country and its 
newly formed Democratic party. With strong American backing over the next 
two years Berisha was able to build his new career.
Actors in the transition
A. Elites
Domestic actors
Due to previous political experience and the concomitant developments in the 
former  Yugoslavia,  the  fear  of  a  civil  war  was  strong  both  in  Albania  and 
abroad. Therefore, most of the literature sees the Albanian regime change as 
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relatively peaceful and non-bloody. Many observers highlight the moderation of 
the  two  opposed  political  leaders,  Ramiz  Alia  and  Sali  Berisha,  at  crucial 
moments (e.g. Devole, 1998:31; Morozzo della Rocca, 1997:25). 
The communist elite initially sought to limit the breadth of the political 
transformation, but when it realized the impossibility to control change from 
above it renounced state violence. As for the opposition, during the first few 
months after the introduction of the multiparty system, the uncertain political 
context and the fear of losing the achievements secured made the DP leaders 
cautious. Abrahams (forthcoming) identifies the reason for the initial absence of 
violence  in  the  continuity  of  political  elites.  Indeed,  the  first  leaders  of  the 
Democratic Party of Albania had been drawn by the Communist regime from its 
own trustworthy members  in  the  local  intelligentsia  to  become  interlocutors 
with the mobilized  students.  The new political  elite soon developed its  own 
agenda and proved more inclined to confrontation than conciliation after  the 
regime change. 
What is certain is that the DP party founders were not dissidents who had 
struggled for years against the regime. They did not emerge from the traditional 
source  of  Albanian  anti-communist  movements,  that  is  the  nationalists  and 
monarchists. As highlighted by Abrahams (forthcoming), the communists and 
the democrats agreed to release the most sensitive political prisoners less than 
two weeks before the first free elections in 1991, meaning they were ineligible 
to run for  parliamentary seats. Fatos Lubonja stresses that the DP considered 
them  a  potential  menace  but,  by  turning  political  prisoners  into  a  tool  of 
political  propaganda,  was  able  to  exhibit  them  during  public  events  (in 
Bazzocchi 2004:99-101). As these were people who had spent years in prison it 
was generally difficult for them to start a new life, while it was easy for the new 
party leadership to marginalize them.
Due to the Stalinist nature of the Albanian regime, there was no other 
important actor on the scene apart from intellectuals who, as discussed further 
on in this paper, had gained some kind of status. Since there was no freedom in 
any sphere, and the economy had reached such a level of paralysis by the turn of 
the 1990s, not even the managers of the state factories or collective farms were 
potentially  relevant  social  actors,  either  then  or  later.  In  addition,  once  the 
reforms began in 1992,  people  from every  social  group,  including the most 
skilled and professional strata of the population, saw their social statuses change 
dramatically and were obliged to reinvent their lives to cope with the drastic fall 
in living standards (Vikers 1997:8).
The novelty that followed the collapse of the system was the arrival of 
foreign funds to establish NGOs. In Albania independent social organizations 
did not pre-exist these donors, as all organizations were controlled by the party. 
Western donors invested resources to form new civil society organizations and 
contribute  to  the  democratization  of  the  country.  In  a  situation  of  profound 
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uncertainty  and  extreme  economic  impoverishment,  NGOs  become  a 
fundamental safety net and later a job market for elites, especially intellectuals. 
In  the  Tirana  area  particularly  hundreds  of  think-tanks,  women’s  and youth 
associations,  human  rights  groups  and  environmental  organizations  were 
established  (Vaso,  1998;  Romano  2000;  Ruli  2003,  Sampson  2006).  A few 
gradually structured their goals and strategies, developed some experience in 
the field  and carried out  a  significant  number  of  projects.  Yet  they did  not 
achieve much reputation in Albanian public opinion, nor did they ever become 
civil  society  actors  in  the  full  meaning  of  the  term  (Chiodi  2007b).  The 
relationship between Albanian NGOs and the population remained weak, with 
low public  awareness  and  trust  in  their  activities  (ICG 1999).  The  lack  of 
previous  experience  of  independent  civil  society  organizations  made  the 
Albanian NGOs’ relationships with donors very close, and the struggle to gain 
social legitimacy particularly difficult. 
The Army 
The Army had been reduced to complete silence after the far-reaching purges of 
the 1970s, when Hoxha eliminated all potential rival centres of power from the 
public administration as a whole (Biberaj 1998). Until  the final  crisis of the 
system, the army was an important tool to enforce ideological conformity, but 
totally  subordinated  to  the  party's  Secretary  General.  The  result  of  Hoxha's 
policy of total party dominance over the security apparatus was that neither the 
Army nor the Ministry of Defense could really challenge Alias' power during 
the regime crisis (Vickers 1997: 212). 
The Army was the protagonist during a critical moment on February 22nd 
1991 when a group of military students and officers at the Academy and the 
Military School expressed their concern over the toppling of Hoxha's statue and 
threatened to attack the state television centre if no explanation for the lack of 
defence  of  public  order  were  provided.  Outside  the  Academy,  improvised 
barricades  were built  by  ordinary citizens  to  prevent  the  replacement  of  the 
statue. As the special police forces tried to disperse the crowds four people died, 
including one member of the police. The day after the Military Academy was 
attacked  with  Molotov  cocktails,  stones  and  metal  rods.  The  water  and 
electricity supplies to the building were cut. A tank full of military students was 
blocked outside the Academy while someone blew up the building walls using 
dynamite (Abrahams forthcoming). Once again a crucial role was assumed by a 
Democratic  Party  delegation  who  mediated  between  the  Academy  students, 
defenders of the regime symbols, and the infuriated protesters. It was evident 
then  that  the  Army  could  not  threaten  Alia's  role  in  the  transition  nor  the 
liberalization process. 
Rather, the Army’s weakness was among the reasons behind the state’s 
collapse and the situation of chaos that reigned in 1991-92. In August  1991 
22
president Alia held a meeting with the Defence Chief to request that the Army 
restore its internal order after episodes of discipline breaking down and looting 
in Kukes (Vickers 1997:71). The military apparatus was reformed by the end of 
1991 under the coalition government,  but a more radical transformation was 
carried  out  by  the  new DP government,  which rapidly  reduced its  size  and 
sought foreign assistance for its modernization. 
Religious institutions
Traditionally  Albanians  belong  to  four  major  religious  traditions:  the  Sunni 
majority and the Bektashi Muslim minority, and the Orthodox and the Catholic 
Christians. Under the communist rule, all religious institutions were annihilated 
following the decision to make Albania the first atheist country in the world, 
taken in 1967 following years of anti-religious campaigns that had already led 
to  the closure  of  churches  and mosques  and the killing  or  imprisonment  of 
members of all clergies. 
It was May 1990 when the offense of religious propaganda was removed 
from criminal law and churches and mosques were gradually reopened. On 20th 
March 1991 a delegation from the Vatican visited Albania. Right before the first 
multi-party  elections,  on  the  occasion  of  the  Easter  festivities,  the  Tirana 
cathedral,  once  transformed into a  cinema,  was  reopened.  Mother  Teresa  of 
Calcutta, an ethnic Albanian from Macedonia, participated in the holy Saturday 
Mass. In the same period, the Orthodox Church also reopened and the Tirana 
mosque  posted  the  dates  for  Ramadan  (Champseix  1992:186).  However, 
religious institutions were not available to support or stimulate protests and only 
a few individuals emerged as significant public figures in the last stage of the 
regime’s crisis, such as the Catholic priest Simon Jubani (see below). 
Intellectuals 
The long experience of the repression of dissent did not allow intellectuals in 
Albania to play a role similar to that of their Central European counterparts: no 
dissident  groups  were  tolerated  in  Albania.  In  addition,  the  isolation  of  the 
country was such that the European dissident debates could not include the local 
cultural elite in any form. For instance, in the years before the regime collapsed, 
debates were not even framed in the language of civil society used by central 
European intellectuals. Right up until its final days, the regime’s apparatus of 
repression was very successful in preventing the emergence of open criticism, 
and not even those few people who could, under the strict control of the secret 
services,  travel  abroad  dared  to  openly  challenge  even  the  language  of  the 
system.  Therefore,  debates  were  shaped  by  the  mummified  language  of  the 
communist apparatus with the party leader Ramiz Alia arguing in favour of the 
“pluralism of ideas” but against real political pluralism.
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In a country where 80% of the population was illiterate in 1945, there 
were no universities until 1957 and that which did open in Tirana was shaped 
around the  regime’s  ideology.  Most  of  the  pre-communist  intellectual  elites 
were killed during the first few years of communism. A second dramatic period 
followed with the Maoist anti-intellectual propaganda of the 1970s, fortunately 
less  violent  than  the  Chinese  Cultural  Revolution,  but  still  effectively 
discouraging  any  public  intellectual  resistance  (Blumi  1997).  This 
notwithstanding,  the  intelligentia  popullore (intellectuals  of  the  people) 
emerged  as  a  specific  social  category  during  communist  rule.  The  socialist 
rhetoric described a society based around the revolutionary class, the working 
class,  with  peasants  holding  revolutionary  potential,  and  its  intelligentia 
popullore in  charge  of  educating  the  workers  engaged  in  the  edification  of 
socialism (Chiodi 2007). The communist regime did not tolerate any form of 
intellectual freedom and the choice for the  intelligentia was either silence or 
coexistence in some form.  
When the grip of repression finally loosened, some intellectuals ‘organic’ 
to  the  system  worked  for  its  democratization.  The  first  timid  requests  for 
intellectual  freedom  emerged  in  the  beginning  of  1988,  but  the  kind  of 
intellectual liberalization that took place in the literary field was the official 
approval of a few novels written by the internationally renowned Ismail Kadare 
in an unreal socialist style. In 1989 Kadare criticized political interference in the 
artistic realm, saying it limited creativity, at a literary conference. In September 
1989  a  novel  entitled  Knives by  Neshat  Tozaj,  which  attacked  the  dreaded 
Albanian  security  forces,  the  Sigurimi,  was  published.  The  author  was  an 
employee  of  the  Interior  Ministry  and  even  though  the  plot  referred  to  an 
officially  disgraced  period  a  couple  of  decades  before,  the  denunciation  of 
police  abuses  of  power  was  unprecedented  (Champseix,  1990:  310).  The 
publication of Tozaj's novel marked the timid beginning of intellectual dissent 
and the possibility of mentioning human rights violations. 
From the spring of 1990 onwards, encouraged by the regime, the press 
started  to  explore  taboo  topics,  and  the  wave  of  public  discussions  swept 
through the major towns and the university of Tirana (Vickers 1997: 23). Alia's 
strategy was to allow trusted public figures to prepare the ground for his limited 
reforms. Many writers, scholars and journalists then started to organize. Among 
these were a group of journalists who gathered around the periodical Bashkimi, 
requesting independent editorial choices, while the first organization for human 
rights was formed around the historian Arben Puto. Every public figure who 
expressed critical  stances  of  any kind was under  terrible  pressure,  receiving 
menacing  phone  calls  or  other  intimidation,  and  the  course  of  political 
transformation was slow and unpredictable. 
Indeed, Alia looked for the intellectuals' support to balance out the hard-
liners in the Party and on a few occasions during those months he invited some 
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to privately debate  the reforms he envisaged.  In August  1990, the Secretary 
General  discussed  the  possibility  of  introducing  political  pluralism  in  the 
country  with  a  number  of  leading  intellectuals.  As  stressed  by  Abrahams 
(forthcoming) the information we have about these meetings shows the complex 
relationship  intellectuals  entertained  with  the  state  a  few  months  before  its 
collapse. Kadare was one of these public figures, members of the Communist 
party who were co-opted by the regime to assure a process of limited opening in 
the country. His choice to seek asylum in France in October 1990, as already 
mentioned, was particularly traumatic for the nascent Albanian public sphere. 
Many  interpreted  it  as  a  betrayal  at  the  moment  of  utmost  need,  others  in 
retrospect  stressed how his move encouraged students to protest.  It  certainly 
demonstrates the centrality of intellectual elites in the country.
Later, during the political upheaval against the regime in December 1990, 
some professors  supported  the  mobilized  university  students  against  the  old 
guard of party militants.  Among the public figures that played a role during 
those days, the most important was Sali Berisha, a respected cardiologist and 
Tirana Hospital party chief who later became the leader of the opposition. From 
May  1990  on  a  few  of  his  articles  had  appeared  in  the  press  asking  for 
democratization, the end of international isolation, and support for Albanians in 
Kosovo. He was among the few intellectuals to meet Alia in August. But above 
all,  Berisha  was chosen by Alia  as  a  mediator  with the students  during the 
protests and turned into an opposition leader within a few days. However, he 
did not hand in his Communist Party membership card until February 1991. His 
cautious  attitude  was  abandoned  once  and  for  all  after  the  first  multi-party 
elections and his rise to power culminated a year later in December 1991, at 
which point he ousted all possible competitors from his own party.
The intelligentia popullore retained its central role in communist Albania, 
where public debate was very constrained, until 1990. Once the regime change 
occurred there was not enough time or space to debate what kind of social, 
political  and  economic  institutions  would  be  preferable  for  post-communist 
Albania. In addition, the depth of the economic crisis wiped out state funds for 
any kind of  intellectual  production or  expression for  the whole decade.  The 
problem of having missed the opportunity to imagine the country's future was 
repeatedly stressed by Fatos Lubonja, who had been imprisoned for 17 years 
and who became one of the leading public intellectuals after 1991. Later, the 
situation gradually improved, but many of the fundamental choices had already 
been  taken  during  the  dramatic  first  few  years  of  the  transition  (Bazzocchi 
2004).   
International actors
The role of foreign interference aimed at accelerating regime change in Albania 
should not be overestimated. Indeed, the Summer 1990 “embassy crisis” was 
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backed  by  western  governments  (Abrahams  forthcoming).  Germany,  Italy, 
France and Greece supported this protest they though would weaken the regime. 
Indeed, the first person to attempt the move was contacted by a Greek emissary. 
In the following years, Italy and Greece were deeply involved in the Albanian 
transition due to issues ranging from military-diplomatic affairs to migration.  
However, what mattered most for the regime change was the “contagion” 
both from the democratic transitions in central Europe and the new awareness of 
the  life  people  could  live  abroad.  A  crucial  role  was  played  by  the  US 
programme  Voice  of  America,  as  once  telephone  lines  were  opened  the 
Albanian-language  radio  service  broadcast  cautious  internal  criticism  by 
interviewing  economists,  writers  and  professors  (Abrahams  forthcoming). 
Equally important were the TV and Radio programmes from the neighbouring 
Yugoslavia,  Greece  and  Italy.  Simply  by  addressing  their  respective  public 
opinions these programmes informed and influenced Albanians' perceptions. By 
the end of the 1980s everyone ready to risk it could access these alternative 
sources of information on world events with the most rudimentary home-made 
antennas. While Albania was facing a devastating economic crisis, TV images 
of an unknown prosperity were easily accessible and much sought (Chiodi & 
Devole 2007). 
Later,  a  few  American  and  European  foundations  were  among  the 
international  actors  that  played  a  role  in  the  Albanian  transition.  After  the 
extraordinary success of Baker's visit to Albania in June 1991, the American 
International Republican Institute (IRI) and National Democratic Institute (NDI) 
actively supported the Democratic Party, financing its campaign for the 1992 
political elections, providing expertise and giving generous aid. The American 
embassy  was  particularly  outspoken  in  campaigning  for  the  DP  with  the 
ambassador  appearing  on  the  podium  during  electoral  rallies  (Abrahams 
forthcoming).  Similarly,  the  British  and  the  German  conservative  parties 
assisted  the  Democratic  Party  from  1991  onwards.  With  the  collapse  of 
Yugoslavia nearby, Albania had a strategic role to play for a few years. Finally, 
a significant  role was played by international  NGOs,  as  they contributed by 
providing humanitarian aid during the worst period of the economic transition 
and, later, at the political level once the regime change was complete (Sampson 
1996). 
B. Civil society
Democratization movements
The most important collective actors to openly challenge the regime were the 
student movement and the workers’ movement, with the latter staging strikes to 
demand better living conditions and political liberalization. As the mobilization 
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of society turned out to be ephemeral, the relevance of these events has been 
played down in most of the literature focusing on the political elite or, if looking 
at grassroots, on the large-scale exodus and the cultural origins of the myth of 
the West that spread in Albania before the collapse of the regime. 
It  was  certainly  very  difficult  for  social  movements  to  emerge  in  the 
country,  as  the  totalitarian  regime  had eliminated  or  controlled  all  potential 
mobilizing  structures,  strove  to  manipulate  the  liberalization  process  and 
continued  to  dominate  the  population  through  the  secret  services.  Once  the 
student movement emerged in December 1990 it became a catalyst for other 
civil  society  initiatives:  the  birth  of  the  first  independent  trade  union 
organization, journalists’ struggles for editorial freedom, the establishment of 
the first  human rights group etc.  These experiences were nevertheless short-
lived and many of the leaders soon joined the political  parties that were re-
emerging in  the  same period.  Many of  the participants  in  the  mobilizations 
emigrated with the hundreds of thousands of people that left the country in the 
following years.  
Student movement
The student movement was the first and most important non-elite actor in the 
Albanian  transition.  A  few  episodes  of  protest  occurred  in  Shkodër  at  the 
beginning of 1990, but the movement that catalysed change took place in Tirana 
in December 1990. 
The students started with economic requests, since the protest originated 
in frustration against another power cut in the Student City, but they quickly put 
political demands to the communist regime. In the Student City’s open space, 
renamed Democracy Square, the student leaders elaborated the first list of nine 
points on December 10th 1990, outlining both economic and political demands 
including  the  acceleration  of  democratic  reforms,  political  pluralism,  the 
punishment of police officers who had beaten students in previous days and the 
legalization of  the Organization  of  Students  and Young Intellectuals  created 
during the protest  and soon to become the first  opposition party (Abrahams 
forthcoming). 
The  organizing  committee  held  a  first  meeting  with  two  of  Alia's 
officials, the Minister of Education and the Head of the Communist Youth. Four 
other leading northern Albanian intellectuals participated in the discussions: one 
was the cardiologist Sali Berisha, who soon became the unchallenged leader of 
the Democratic  Party  for  the following 20 years.  He was  among those  that 
insisted  on  interrupting  the  protests  in  order  to  hold  a  meeting  with  the 
Secretary General. Tension was high at the meeting as the students vehemently 
refused  the  idea  of  moderation,  fearing  the  protests  would  lose  momentum. 
Contrary to expectations, Alia accepted to meet the students at the presidential 
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palace the next evening, even with the ongoing protests. 
On the  fourth  day of  protests  the  students  were  joined by professors, 
workers and common citizens demanding political and economic reforms. By 
the  afternoon,  80,000  people  had  gathered  in  the  Student  City  square.  The 
delegates to meet with Alia were chosen from the various faculties in the first 
democratic  consultation  ever  held  in  the  country.  They  accepted  Alia  as 
interlocutor in his role of President of the Republic but not as Secretary General 
of the Communist party. At the meeting Alia announced the decision by the 
Central  Committee  to  introduce  political  pluralism (Abrahams  forthcoming). 
The students had in fact brought up the issue of political pluralism but Alia 
wanted to take credit for it. 
During the months between December 1990 and March 1991, along with 
a  few  former  political  prisoners,  the  mobilized  students  pushed  the  newly 
formed  Democratic  Party  towards  a  more  confrontational  approach  to  the 
regime.  They  criticized  the   conciliatory  and  obedient  approach  that  the 
intellectuals and the new DP leadership had chosen. The latter, in fact, focused 
on the upcoming elections and was afraid of allowing the conservative members 
of  the  Party  to  interrupt  the  democratization  process.  Finally,  with  the 
strengthening of the DP, the student leaders were marginalised within the new 
party. Among the communist intellectual protagonists of these events, Mustafaj 
(1993:61) stresses the importance of their leading role, as the students lacked 
experience and a  clear  political  view.  However,  as  he also notes,  there was 
disappointment among the students once they realized that these intellectuals 
sent  by  the  Communist  party  to  mediate  with  them  were  taking  over  the 
leadership of the movement by ousting them. Few of the protagonists of the 
student  struggles  that  took  place  between  December  1990  and  March  1991 
remained politically active later on, and many emigrated.  
Labour movement
As in any Stalinist country, the Albanian trade unions served as transmission 
belts for political power in workplaces.  They controlled workers in terms of 
both productivity and political  behavior rather  than protecting their rights or 
working to improve their conditions. They had their “golden age” in 1991-1992 
after the first independent Union was legalized (Chiodi 2007:225). Thereafter 
they faced a sharp decline due to the economic catastrophe of the following 
years, suffering under the new authoritarian turn and marginalized by the new 
emerging  private  sector  (Vaugham-Withehead  1999).  Accounts  describing 
workers'  participation in the democratization movements in Albania are rare. 
One of the few foreign witnesses, MEP Alexander Langer who took part in a 
diplomatic mission to Tirana during the crucial weeks of December 1990, gives 
a  sympathetic  and  emotionally  strong  account  of  the  events  in  his  travel 
notebook: “One hears talks about a number of factories in which workers would 
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have sympathized with the students, the printers were on strike and even sent 
their representatives to the join them, as well as in other factories there would 
be support for the students' cause”(Langer, 1996:227). 
The first independent trade union, the Free and independent syndicate of 
miners,  was  established  in  February  1991.  The  creation  of  the  Union  of 
Independent  Trade  Unions  of  Albania  (BSPSH)  followed  the  days  of 
mobilization in Tirana. Its foundation entailed a dramatic membership loss for 
the communist-led United Trade Unions of Albania (BPSH), which had a hard 
time freeing itself from the reputation of being a tool in the hands of the ruling 
party  even  after  reorganizing  as  the  Confederation  of  independent  workers 
unions of Albania (KSSH) in April 1991.   
The Union of Independent Trade Unions of Albania (BSPSH) was the 
protagonist of the May 1991 general strike already described. This, as well as 
previous strikes, aimed not only at securing better economic conditions, but also 
political liberalization. The demands of 50% pay rises and six hour working 
days  were  probably  unrealistic  requests  with  the  country  facing  economic 
disintegration, but they obtained the government’s resignation. When the miners 
joined the protests with their hunger strike it was clear that the communists, 
despite  keeping  the  majority  in  parliament,  had  lost  the  country  (Vickers 
1997:65). This first large-scale mobilization showed growing intransigence at 
street level. Even though the economic situation worsened, becoming downright 
dramatic, the protest waves continued during the months following the general 
strike.  The  major  opposition  party  stood  back,  but  was  gradually  losing  its 
influence  over  the  social  movement  (Abrahms  forthcoming).  The  winter  of 
1991-92  was  characterized  by  a  situation  of  breakdown  in  labour  force 
organization  and  discipline  in  the  factories;  many  enterprises  never  again 
resumed production (Vickers 1997:66).
In the first few months after the 1992 elections, the first DP government 
was  confronted  with  independent  trade  unions  and  unpredictable  labour 
protests. From April 1992 the resumption of widespread strike activities saw the 
BSPSH under  pressure  to  continue  to  represent  the  radical  demands  of  the 
workers  while  the new government  expected it  to  stabilize  the political  and 
economic situation. As the protests continued, the DP reacted by crushing them 
with the use of paramilitary forces as described above (Schmidt-Neke 1992:6). 
The new DP government continued the old practice of controlling the media; as 
Vickers (1997:90) observed: “In a nation plagued with strikes the media only  
transmitted news of workers agreeing to go back to work.” In fact, the many 
social and economic conflicts taking place at the time were seldom reported, 
and people learned about important protests such as a two-week strike in the 
railway sector only when they found the stations closed in May 1992 (Vickers 
1997:90).  The  combination  of  local  media  manipulation  and  foreign  media 
neglect explains the limited availability of analyses of social movements in the 
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Albanian transition.
In the following years the two main trade unions identified themselves 
with one of the main political parties, that is the Socialist or Democratic parties,  
and remained trapped within the harsh political battle between them. They thus 
lost the autonomy and credibility they had achieved in the eyes of the public 
during the transition. 
New social movements
New social movements could not generally emerge in a context of widespread 
economic deprivation and the lack of basic individual freedoms, but with the 
exception  of  initiatives  around  fundamental  human  rights  issues.  It  was  a 
university professor, the historian Arben Puto, who became the leader the first 
Forum for the defence of human rights  (Forumi për Mbrojtjen e të  Drejtave te  
Njeriut), established  to  monitor  the  release  of  political  prisoners  (Vickers 
1997:38). 
Albania  in  1990 still  had the  highest  number  of  political  prisoners  in 
Europe. It was late 1990 when a significant number were released. A Human 
Rights Watch report from the time describes the situation well:  “According to 
the government, 191 political prisoners were released in 1990, another 202 in  
January  1991,  and 126 on March 17.  On July  2nd,  President  Alia signed a  
decree  granting  amnesty  to  all  prisoners  convicted  of  espionage,  sabotage,  
diversion and terrorist acts, as well as those convicted of slandering high state  
organs;  approximately  ninety  prisoners  were  released following the decree” 
(HRW 1992). In August 1991 the released prisoners set up the Association of 
former political prisoners to help their reintegration into society. Many not only 
had to find a job, but also had neither housing nor documents and continued to 
suffer the consequences of their years in detention. On September 21st 1991 a 
group  of  political  prisoners  went  on  hunger  strike  in  Tirana,  asking  for 
rehabilitation, the restitution of confiscated properties,  economic support and 
housing assistance,  the identification of  the graves of  prisoners who died in 
detention and the return of their bodies to their families. By September 30 th, an 
Amnesty Law was approved for political prisoners and compensation foreseen 
for all those who had been convicted, deported or sent into internal exile for 
crimes of conscience (HRW 1992). The association continued but the political 
prisoners never really achieved political  relevance in the country,  as already 
discussed above.
As for gender issues, the Albanian regime, like other communist systems, 
promoted  women’s  education  and  participation  in  its  labour  intensive 
modernization process and organized women in mass organizations. Contrary to 
other  countries in the bloc, however, female participation coexisted with the 
prohibition of abortion and the discouragement of divorce in Albania due to its 
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Stalinist course, maintained until the regime’s end. In the account of a march 
held  on  February  20th  1991,  Abrahams  (forthcoming)  recalls  an  episode 
involving the actress Rajmonda Bulku, who incited women in the rally to lead 
the march in favour of the student strike, and how it was a group of women that 
set  forth  while  men  followed  suit.  Besides  this  occurrence,  no  other  major 
female  mobilization  was  evident  in  the  Albanian  transition.  Many  women's 
NGOs formed  later  on  and often  with  a  clear  party  affiliation,  such  as  the 
Democratic League of Albanian women, linked to the Democratic Party, or the 
Forum of Republican women linked to the Republican party. As stressed by 
Young (2000:150)  such  women's  groups  aimed  fundamentally  at  mobilizing 
women to vote for their political party of choice.
The first environmental party was established in 1991 but with its small 
constituencies  it  never  achieved  any  real  political  relevance  in  the  country 
(Vickers  1997:56).  Nothing  resembling  a  gay,  lesbian  or  queer  movement 
played any role in the Albanian transition. Twenty years after the collapse of the 
regime, homosexuality is still taboo and hardly any organization is visible in the 
Albanian  public  sphere,  although the  first  association  named 'the Gay  Club' 
announced it existence in 1994 (Vickers 1997:139). At that time the communist 
law on homosexuality was still in force and members of the group were beaten 
heavily  by  police  in  October  1994  (HRW  1996).  Decriminalization  was 
obtained only in 1995 thanks to substantial international pressure.
Once the regime had collapsed,  the severe public  order  problems that 
troubled the country provoked a number of citizen protests focusing on security 
issues. Of the few records available on these movements, Vickers (1997:129) 
recalls how teachers and pupils, organized around the Independent educational 
union of the Shkodër district, boycotted lessons and organized a rally calling for 
order against vandalism and violence at school in February 1992. 
Ethnic movements
At the turn of the 80s, Ethnic Albanians made up around 95% of the population. 
The law used to divide ethnic minorities into three national minorities: Greeks, 
Macedonians  and  Montenegrins;  and  two  linguistic  minorities:  Roma  and 
Vlachs/Aromanians.3 Of  these  small  ethnic  groups,  the  Greek  minority 
constituted  the  biggest,  numbering  59,000  citizens  according  to  the  1989 
Census, and growing political relevance due to the role of neighboring Greece. 
In  the first  few years  of  transition  the ethnic  Greeks  emerged as  a  relevant 
political actor despite the ban on forming ethnic parties. They established the 
organization Omonia to represent the minority and created the predominantly 
Greek Union for the Defence of Human Rights political party that gained five 
representatives in the 1991 electoral competition and two at the second general 
3 At the time, the Egyptians, as they call themselves, were not recognized as a different group but con-
sidered part of the Roma minority (Krasniqi 2010).
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elections in 1992. However, the situation began to deteriorate soon after  the 
democratization  process  started  due  on  one  hand  to  President  Berisha's 
authoritarian turn and strong political  interference from Athens on the other, 
reaching the lowest  levels  in  1994 with the arrests  of  five Omonia  political 
activists.
Besides national minorities and the religious cleavages discussed below, 
the identification  of  Albanians with their  territorial  belonging and language, 
which varies between the northern Ghegue speech and the southern Tosc, has 
considerable political relevance. Even though the last communist leader, Ramiz 
Alia, was a northerner, the communist  regime was shaped by southern elite, 
since  Enver  Hoxha  originally  came  from the  southern  town  of  Gjirokaster. 
Apart from elite selection, the North perceived itself as discriminated against in 
many ways, including the linguistic choice made in the 1970s of standardizing 
the official language around the southern variation. 
The organizing committee of the 1990 student movement was constituted 
by  a  majority  of  northern  origin  and  Alia’s  delegation  was  made  up  of 
northerners  like  Berisha  and  Mustafaj  (Abrahams  forthcoming).  In  post-
communist  Albania,  the  new  leadership  selected  a  consistent  number  of 
government employees among fellow northerners, especially in the police and 
secret services.  Finally, the Catholic community, predominantly based in the 
North, also turned out to be a relevant anti-communist actor as discussed below. 
One cannot speak of social movements here, but social cleavages mattered in 
the regime change dynamics. 
Religious movements 
If no religious movement was central to the regime change in Albania, some 
kind of religious cleavage came to be relevant in 1990. The Northern city of 
Shkodër, where the largest Albanian Catholic community was based became 
one of the strongholds of the opposition movement. The secret police viewed 
the Catholic community in Shkodër as the 5th column of the Vatican. Here the 
small group of people that had attempted a first failed protest on 11th January 
1990  decided  to  organize  another  demonstration  on  January  14th, asking  a 
Catholic  priest,  Simon  Jubani,  released  from prison  just  a  year  earlier  after 
twenty-six  years  behind  bars,  to  lead  the  protest  following  the  Romanian 
example. At the time Jubani cordially refused (Abrahams forthcoming) but a 
month later,  on November 4th, when a few thousand people gathered at the 
city’s Catholic cemetery, they finally convinced him to hold a mass in open 
violation of the atheist prescriptions of the Albanian communist state. A few 
days later, on November 11th, tens of thousands gathered to celebrate a mass at 
the cathedral that had been converted into a sports hall.  Among the participants 
were not only Catholics but also Muslims and Orthodox Christians (Abhrams 
forthcoming).  Later,  the Catholics  supported  the  mufti  as  they reopened the 
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main city Mosques.
These episodes in Shkodër were limited but powerful signs of the rebirth 
of civil society. However, the dependence on foreign aid in the post-communist 
years provoked tensions among the Albanian religious communities: the Sunni 
Muslims were targeted by competing foreign influences, especially from Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey; and many evangelical Christian groups were struggling with 
all  traditional  groups  to  convert  Albanians.  Finally,  the Orthodox Christians 
remained trapped within Greek-Albanian tensions as Greek nationalists tend to 
consider all Albanian Orthodox to be Greek (Vickers 1997: 96-117). 
Concluding remarks
The turbulent Albanian transition was not a velvet revolution, but after the long 
years of the Stalinist  regime no one expected a smooth regime change.  The 
communist  elite  endeavoured  to  use  its  power  to  limit  the  breadth  of  the 
political transformation, but only managed to postpone the regime’s collapse for 
a few months. However, when it realized it was impossible to control change 
from above it renounced state violence. Thus, the Albanian transition was not 
characterized by bloodbaths, but rather by a steady stream of violence provoked 
by the economic and institutional breakdown. After decades of totalitarian rule, 
the  first  signs  of  the  deep  hidden  discontent  emerged  during  the  so-called 
embassy crisis of July 1990 which saw the first mass flight of Albanians from 
the country. As in the German case, it was the exit choice of hundreds of people 
that strengthened their voice. Albanian civil society had been annihilated by the 
regime, but the velvet revolutions stimulated hundreds of young people to try to 
escape  the  country  where  they  had been confined  and isolated  for  decades. 
Their  choice  had  a  tremendous  impact  on  nascent  Albanian  public  opinion 
facing  the  exasperating  slowness  of  political  reform  and  the  degenerating 
economic  situation.  University  students  were  the  first  to  mobilize  and 
stimulated the birth of a wide protest movement from December 1990 on, a year 
after the revolutions in the Communist bloc. After the students, workers took to 
the  streets  and  established  the  first  independent  trade  union,  journalists 
struggled for press freedom and the first human rights group was established. 
These experiences were nevertheless short-lived and soon marginalized 
by  the  new  political  elites  that  emerged  from the  intellectual  milieus  once 
'organic' to the system. Few of the protagonists of the struggles that took place 
between December 1990 and March 1991 remained politically active, and many 
emigrated abroad after being hit by the harsh economic situation in the country. 
Retrospectively,  the  centrality  of  youth  in  the  Albanian  transition  was 
predictable for a country whose population had tripled in just a few decades 
under a modernizing system. Similarly, one could expect the intelligentsia to 
have played a role, given the centrality attributed to it by a communist regime 
that had managed to annihilate all other sources of social power. Finally, once 
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the fear of protesting faded, the intransigence of the workers’ protests mirrored 
as  much  as  they  worsened  the  economic  deadlock  already  reached  in  the 
country.
The peculiarity and the paradox of the Albanian transition was that its 
late-in-coming protest waves occurred in a situation of state disintegration. The 
totalitarian state that had profoundly transformed Albanian society for 45 years 
fell under large-scale exoduses, the spontaneous de-collectivization of the land, 
the abandonment of factories and the widespread destruction of public property. 
This situation of state collapse, unprecedented for a European state, constituted 
a considerable encumbrance for the re-emerging Albanian civil society. 
References
Abrahams Fred (forthcoming), Untitled,  New York University Press.
Baruti  Fasfi.  (1996)  "A General  Outlook  on  Albanian  NGOs  ’96."  NGO 
Bulletin, no. 12, December : Special Issue. 
Bazzocchi Claudio (2004) Fatos Lubonja. Intervista sull'Albania. Dalle carceri  
di Enver Hoxha al liberismo selvaggio, Bologna: Il Ponte. 
Biberaj Elez (1998) in Sabrina P- Ramet, Eastern Europe. Politics, Culture and  
Society since 1939,  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp.251-283. 
Blumi Isa (1997) "The Politics of Culture and Power: the Roots of Hoxha’s 
34
Postwar State." East European Quarterly XXXI, no. 3, pp. 379-98.
Champseix Elisabeth & Champ Jean-Paul, (1992)  L'Albanie out la logique du  
désespoir, Paris: Édition  la Découvert. 
Champseix, Elisabeth and Jean-Paul Champseix (1990)  57, Boulevard Stalin. 
Paris: Editions La Découverte.
Chiodi Luisa (2007)  Transnational Policies of Emancipation or Colonisation?  
Civil Society Promotion in Post-Communist Albania PdH dissertation, Florence: 
European  University  Institute, 
cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/7036/2007_Chiodi.pdf?sequence=1.
Chiodi  Luisa  (2007b)  “The  Profession  of  Civil  Society  in  Post-Communist 
Albania,” Albanian Journal of Politics, vol. IV, issue I (June).
Chiodi  Luisa  e  Devole  Rando  (2006),  'Conflicting  memorie  and  mutual 
representations:  Italy  and  Albania  1989',  Occasional  Paper  n.2  gennaio, 
Rovereto (TN): Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso.
Devole Rando (1998)  Albania.  Fenomeni  Sociali  e  Rappresentazioni.  Roma: 
Agrilavoro Edizioni.
Elbasani Arolda (2008) 'Political transformation and implementation of the EU's 
democratic requirements in Albania', In Elbasani, Ristani, Vurmo,  Integration 
Perspectives  and  Synergic  Effects  of  European  Transformation.  Budapest: 
Centre for EU Enlargement Studies.
Hirschman Albert (1993) "Exit, Voice and the Fate of the German Democratic 
Republic. An Essay in Conceptual History." World Politics 45, no. January pp. 
203-41.
Human  Rights  Watch  (1992)  Human  Rights  Watch  World  Report  1992  –  
Albania, 1 January, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca541e.html. 
Human  Rights  Watch  (1996)  Human  Rights  in  Post-Communist  Albania,  1 
March http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a7f30.html. 
International Crisis Group Report  (ICG) (1999) The State of Albania, January.
Keesing's Record of World Events (1992)  Public order bill-Postponement of  
elections, Volume 38, February. 
Keesing's  Record  of  World  Events  (1991)  Wave  of  strikes  and  protests  
Economy, Volume 37, October. 
Keesing's  Record  of  World  Events  (1991b)  Economy  -  Continuing  strikes, 
Volume 37, November.
Keesing's Record of World Events (1990)  Unrest—Foundation of  opposition 
party Government and party—changes, Volume 36, December.
Kola, Paulin. (2003) The Search for Greater Albania. London : Hurst & Co.
35
Krasniqi  Afrim  (2004)   Shoqeria  Civile  Ne  Shqiperi.  Historia  è  Lindjes,  
Shivillimit Dhe Sfidat e Saj. Tirana: Shtypur Geer.
Krasniqi  Gëzim (2010)  Citizenship  in  an emigrant  nation-state:  the  case  of  
Albania, CITSEE Working Paper Series n.13. 
Langer Alexander (1996)  Il Viaggiatore Leggero. Scritti 1961-1995. Palermo: 
Sellerio editore.
Lawrence William (2011) 'Albanians force out Communist government, 1991', 
Global  Non  Violent  Action  Database 
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/albanians-force-out-communist-
government-1991 
Lohmel  Edith  (1996)  "Le  Défis  De  L'Autarchie  Économique."  in   Albanie  
Utopie. Huis Clos Dan Les Balkans. eds. Sonia Combe, and Ivaylo Ditchev, 68-
79. Paris: Edition Autrement.
Morozzo della Rocca Roberto (1997)  Albania. Le radici Della Crisi. Milano: 
Guerini e Associati.
Mustafaj Besnik (1993), Albania. Tra crimini e miraggi. Milano: Garzanti. 
Qesari Eldon (2011) 'La storiografia contemporanea albanese e lo studio della 
storia  recente.  Gli  anni  del  “passaggio  epocale”  (1985-1992)',  in  Antonio 
D'Alessandi e Armando Pitassio, (a cura di) Dopo la pioggia. Gli stati della ex  
Jugoslavia e l'Albania (1991-2011), Lecce: Argo, pp.51-64.
Romano  Onofrio  (1999).  L'Albania  Nell'Era  Televisiva.  Le  Vie  Della  
Demodernizzazione. Torino: L'Harmattan Italia.
Ruli  Genc  (2003)  "Albania.  The  Weakness  of  the  State."  in  Southeastern 
Europe: Weak States and Strong International Support . ed. Wim van MeursVol. 
vol 2. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
Sampson Steven (1996). "The Social Life of Projects: Importing Civil Society 
to Albania." in  Civil Society: Challenging Western Models. editor Chris Hann, 
121-42. London: Routledge.
Schmidt-Neke Michael (1992) 'Albania', in Joan Campbell,  European Labour 
Unions, Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Vaso Adrian (1998) Assessment of NGOs Situation in Albania, Aquarius for the 
World Bank. World Bank, Tirana. 
Vaugham-Withehead  (1999)  Albania  in  Crisis:  The  Predictable  Fall  of  the  
Shining  Star.  Cheltenahm:UK,  Northampton:  MA,  USA:  Edward  Elgar 
Publishing. 
Vickers Miranda, and James Pettifer (1997) Albania. From Anarchy to a Balkan  
Identity. London: Hurst & Company.
Young Antonia (2000) Women who become men. Oxford: Berg.
36
37
